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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RANDY J. MONTOYA, : Case No. 960227-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment 
of conviction entered on March 29, 1996.x R. 184. See 
Addendum A. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
denying Montoya's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the 
interior and trunk of the vehicle where the State claimed that it 
had legally seized such evidence based on an inventory search of 
the vehicle? 
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 The trial court entered judgment of conviction in this case 
on April 7, 1995. R. 55. Montoya filed an untimely pro se Notice 
of Appeal on May 31, 1995. R. 58. This Court remanded the 
original appeal to the trial court for appointment of counsel. 
R. 68. The trial court appointed current counsel. Thereafter, 
this Court dismissed the original appeal based on the filing of an 
untimely Notice of Appeal. Montoya then filed a petition for 
extraordinary relief in the trial court, claiming in part that his 
right to appeal was violated. On March 29, 1996, pursuant to State 
v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), and State v. Hallett, 856 
P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993), Judge Frederick resentenced Montoya 
nunc pro tunc. Montoya filed a timely Notice of Appeal from that 
Order on April 4, 1996. R. 186. 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the trial court's 
determination that a valid inventory search occurred for 
correctness. See State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 
1995); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Any 
underlying factual findings are examined for clear error. State 
v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1994); Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. 
Preservation of the Issue. Defendant/Appellant Randy 
Montoya ("Appellant" or "Montoya") filed a Motion to Suppress and 
supporting Memorandum in the trial court. R. 20-21. A copy of 
the motion and memorandum is contained in Addendum B. On 
February 6, 1995, the trial judge held an evidentiary hearing and 
argument on the motion. R. 93-143. Thereafter, the trial judge 
issued his oral ruling denying Montoya's motion. R. 143-46. The 
trial judge signed written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law ("Findings and Conclusions") on March 24, 1995. R. 50-54. A 
copy of the Findings and Conclusions is contained in Addendum C. 
On February 17, 1995, Montoya entered a conditional plea of 
guilty to the amended charge of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a third degree felony, pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). R. 149-50. 
ISSUE II; Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
concluding that Montoya's Miranda rights were not violated? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's legal conclusion 
is reviewed for correctness. Pena, 869 P.2d at 940-41. The 
trial court is afforded "a measure of discretion" when this Court 
applies that standard of review. Id. Any underlying factual 
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findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. 
Preservation of the Issue. Montoya filed a Motion to 
Suppress and supporting Memorandum in the trial court. R. 2 0-21. 
A copy of the motion and memorandum is contained in Addendum B. 
On February 6, 1995, the trial judge held an evidentiary hearing 
and argument on the motion. R. 93-143. Thereafter, the trial 
judge issued his oral ruling denying Montoya's motion. R. 143-
46. The trial judge signed written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions") on March 24, 
1995. R. 50-54. A copy of the Findings and Conclusions is 
contained in Addendum C. On February 17, 1995, Montoya entered a 
conditional plea of guilty to the amended charge of Possession of 
a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, pursuant to Sery, 
758 P.2d at 935. R. 42, 149-50. 
TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The State charged Montoya with Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled substance with Intent to Distribute, a third degree 
felony; Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor; and Intoxication, a class C misdemeanor. R. 5-6. 
On February 1, 1995, Montoya filed a motion to suppress evidence 
seized from the vehicle and statements made to police officers in 
absence of Miranda warnings. R. 20-22. On February 6, 1995, 
the trial judge held a hearing on the motion to suppress and 
denied the motion. R. 37-38. 
On February 17, 1995, Montoya entered a conditional plea 
of guilty to the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance, 
a third degree felony. R. 39-43. Pursuant to that conditional 
plea, Montoya preserved the right to appeal the trial judge's 
adverse ruling on Montoya's Motion to Suppress. R. 42, 149-50. 
On March 24, 1995, the trial judge entered written Findings and 
Conclusions. R. 50-54. 
On April 7, 1995, the trial judge entered Judgment, 
sentencing Montoya to serve zero to five years at the Utah State 
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Prison. R. 55. On May 23, 1995, Montoya filed a pro se Notice 
of Appeal and Motion to Appoint Counsel. R. 56-59. This Court 
temporarily remanded the case to the trial judge, who appointed 
current counsel on August 31, 1995. R. 68, 70, 72. On 
January 5, 1996, this Court dismissed the appeal based on the 
untimely filing of Appellant's pro se Notice of Appeal. R. 178. 
On January 25, 1996, Montoya filed a Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief. R. 169. That petition was based in part 
on the denial of Montoya's right to appeal his conviction. The 
trial judge granted that petition and sentenced Montoya 
nunc pro tunc on March 29, 1996. R. 184. Montoya filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal on April 4, 1996. R. 186. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 24, 1994 at 3:07 a.m., West Valley Police 
Officer Paul Gill responded to a call at a convenience store 
located at 4600 South and 4000 West in Salt Lake County. R. 93-
95. When Officer Gill arrived at the store, he found Montoya 
standing outside the store next to a car. R. 96. Montoya was 
wearing a button-up shirt, boxers and sandals. R. 96. No one 
else was in or near the vehicle. R. 97. The car did not belong 
to Montoya. R. 106. 
Backup officer Schmidt arrived in a separate police 
vehicle at the same time as Gill or within a minute of his 
arrival. R. 97, 101, 120. Gill talked to Montoya while Schmidt 
stood nearby. R. 96, 121. Montoya appeared nervous, "jerky, not 
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real focused." R. 96. Gill asked Montoya if "he was on any 
medication or anything." R. 96. Montoya responded that he had a 
few beers and a joint. R. 96, 121. The officer described 
Montoya's action as "erratic, jerking motions with his head, his 
arms" and indicated that Montoya's condition worsened as the 
officer talked with him. R. 96. Montoya mumbled and at times 
was not responsive to the officer's questions. R. 96-97. 
At some point, Gill asked Montoya if he could search the 
vehicle. R. 103. Gill testified that he could not remember 
Montoya's response. R. 103. 
Gill decided to take Montoya into custody for public 
intoxication and to call for medical help. R. 97. Gill 
handcuffed Montoya and called for medical help. R. 97, 102. 
According to the officer, Montoya was in custody when the 
handcuffs were placed on him. R. 126. Gill called for Officer 
McCarthy to go to the scene. R. 97. Gill believed McCarthy had 
a little more education "on different types of effects of 
controlled substance or what might be going on with Mr. Montoya." 
R. 98. McCarthy indicated that he was called because the 
officers "wanted to know what type of narcotics [Montoya] might 
be using and what might have been used in the spoon." R. 113. 
McCarthy is considered by some people to be a narcotics expert 
and is often called to the scene when narcotics are being 
investigated. R. 113. 
Gill decided to impound the vehicle because he had 
arrested Montoya. R. 98. Gill and Schmidt searched the 
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passenger compartment of the vehicle before McCarthy arrived. 
R. 112. During the course of the search, Gill saw dollars 
scattered on the floor. R. 98. When the officer reached inside 
the passenger side, he saw a syringe and spoon stuck between the 
console and the passenger seat. R. 98. According to Officer 
Schmidt, " [a]t that point in time the vehicle was going to be 
impounded until Officer McCarthy had arrived and said he knows 
this person and possibly where this owner of the vehicle lived." 
R. 126. 
The police report indicates that the officers were 
searching for narcotics when they went through the car. R. 105. 
Gill testified that there are policies and procedures 
which he follows in impounding a vehicle. R. 103. One of those 
policies and procedures is the filling out of an inventory form 
as part of an inventory search. R. 104. None of the officers 
filled out an inventory form in this case. R. 104. Gill later 
testified that he does not always fill out a form when he does an 
inventory search. R. 105. When later asked, "Isn't [filling out 
a form] standard procedure [for an inventory search]?," Gill 
responded: "Depends on the type of search, depends on the 
totality of the circumstances, whether or not the vehicle's 
taken, state tax impounds, it's on the impound reports. We 
didn't have an impound report at this time." R. 105-06. Gill 
also testified that when he impounds a vehicle, it is his 
procedure to take an inventory of all items in the vehicle. 
R. 98. Gill indicated that when the officers searched the car, 
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they found a number of items which they ordinarily would put on 
an inventory form such as money and a stereo. R. 104. 
When McCarthy arrived, Officers Gill and Schmidt had 
already searched the interior of the vehicle and Montoya was in 
custody. R. 97, 112, 126. McCarthy testified that when he 
arrived, Montoya was handcuffed but not yet in the patrol car. 
R. 107. Officers Gill and Schmidt were talking to Montoya. 
R. 107. Officers Gill and Schmidt told McCarthy the location of 
a syringe and spoon they had found while searching the car. 
R. 112. 
McCarthy recognized Montoya and began talking to him. 
R. 107-08. McCarthy stated that Montoya "had foaming of the 
mouth . . . was real jittery," that his eyes were dilated and "he 
had marks on him to show that he had been intravenously ingesting 
something." R. 108. 
McCarthy asked Montoya "point-blank" whether he "was 
doing some cheve," and Montoya said he was. R. 108. According 
to McCarthy, "cheve" is a street name for heroin. R. 108. 
McCarthy testified that the other officers left the 
search of the vehicle to him, and he saw the spoon and syringe, 
then began working on the trunk. R. 109. McCarthy explained 
that Gill asked him to take care of the search because the other 
officers were trying to find the identity of the vehicle's owner 
and Gill "was going to be transporting to the prison and stuff." 
R. 109. Schmidt was with McCarthy, however, when he searched the 
trunk. R. 99-100, 109, 122. 
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In the trunk, McCarthy found a container in which there 
were five balloons containing aluminum foil and heroin. R. 109. 
The container was on the passenger side in the rear. R. 109. In 
the trunk, there was a piece of carpeting with a spare tire 
underneath it. R. 112. The container was in that vicinity and 
under the carpet. R. 112-13. McCarthy stated that he did not 
think it was under the tire because he tried not to remove the 
tire "because it's a pain because you have to put them back with 
those little wing nuts and stuff," and he could not remember 
removing the tire. R. 113. The trial court found that the 
heroin was found in five containers located under the spare tire. 
R. 51. 
McCarthy indicated that he was familiar with the West 
Valley Police Department's policies regarding inventory searches 
and that he "helped write the zero tolerance policy on impounding 
vehicles." R. 110. He testified that the policy with respect to 
making inventory searches is as follows: 
McCarthy: Any time we arrest anybody, any time a 
vehicle's going to be impounded, an inventory 
will be done, and if possible, a canine officer 
will have the dog do a sniff of the vehicle for 
the purposes of looking for narcotics. 
Prosecutor: And was that policy followed in this 
instance? 
McCarthy: I think we had called for a canine, 
but they got off at two that morning, so there 
wasn't one available. 
Prosecutor: Now do you ordinarily make an 
inventory list in the course of this inventory 
search? 
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McCarthy: No, if there's something out of place, 
you would note it. If there was something of 
value or something like that, you could take it 
into custody or you could give it to the owner. 
We do have an inventory sheet. I very frequently 
use it. I just note it in the narrative of the 
report. 
On cross-examination, McCarthy changed his testimony and 
indicated that he did not frequently use the forms. Instead, he 
stated as follows: 
Defense counsel: We don't have any inventory 
sheets or inventory forms, correct? 
McCarthy: No, I very rarely use them. It's like 
they say, if it's a state tax, that is an 
inventory portion right on the state tax form. 
This vehicle wasn't being seized for that. I'd 
already determined to let the owners have it 
back. 
R. 116. 
When asked whether the West Valley Police Department has 
an inventory sheet, McCarthy responded: 
McCarthy: They do and it's the present policy, 
and the policy then is the supervisor on duty 
determines whether or not the car is going to be 
forfeitable and that night I knew, because there 
was a large lien on it, it was a brand new car, 
the city would not be interested in paying off 
the lien. 
Defense counsel: And isn't it true that the 
normal policy and procedure is to fill out the 
inventory sheet? 
McCarthy: No, like I said, it's -- if it's going 
to be state tax, that is a state tax form. If 
it's just a driver arrest, hold for a warrant, 
there's a section on the back of the handwritten 
report where you can fill in vehicle information. 
As far as inventory, there's been a lot of 
discussion on the bottom because there's no 
section there for locked containers. We've been 
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advised to just make a notation in your report, 
what if anything had to be unlocked or opened. 
R. 117. 
When discussing the reasons for inventory searches, 
McCarthy indicated an additional reason for such searches "is to 
find dope.» R. 118. 
The vehicle was not impounded. The officers asked 
McCarthy to impound the car, and "then once we found out who the 
owners were, that's when I [McCarthy] asked if I could take care 
of it in a different manner." R. 113. McCarthy recognized the 
name of the car's owner and was familiar with the owner's family 
from drug investigations. R. 115. It is not clear from the 
record the point at which McCarthy learned the owner's identity. 
McCarthy and Schmidt went to the owner's residence. 
R. 125. When McCarthy made contact with the owner of the car, he 
asked for consent to search her residence. R. 115-16. Schmidt 
said the owner declined consent. R. 116. Schmidt was not sure 
why McCarthy asked to search the residence, but Schmidt was there 
when McCarthy asked. R. 125. 
Gill attempted to have further conversations with Montoya 
but testified that they "didn't go very far." R. 100. Montoya 
appeared to be having a hard time understanding the questions and 
was not giving direct answers. R. 100. Medical help arrived 
soon thereafter, and Gill's questioning apparently stopped. 
R. 100. 
Gill did not testify as to when he might have given 
Montoya Miranda warnings. He did deny that he never gave Montoya 
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Miranda warnings. R. 105. 
Defense counsel: Isn't it true you never gave 
the defendant any Miranda warnings? 
Officer Gill: No. 
R. 105. 
McCarthy questioned Montoya but did not give him Miranda 
warnings. R. 114. Schmidt also did not give Montoya Miranda 
warnings. R. 124. McCarthy asked Montoya about the owner of the 
vehicle and some other people. R. 114. Even after the drugs 
were found, McCarthy continued to question Montoya without 
Mirandizing him. 
Defense counsel: Isn't it true that even after 
the drugs were found, you continued to 
interrogate the defendant while he was seated in 
the police car? 
McCarthy: Like I said, my concern, it wasn't an 
interrogation type of thing because I know him 
and I know the family. I wanted to make sure he 
was okay. He finally told me he was going to 
overdose and that's why we were concerned about 
medical people. 
R. 118. 
Montoya testified that he was at the convenience store 
that night to purchase cereal, milk, Pepsi, a newspaper, and 
ravioli. R. 128. He had taken a five dollar bill into the store 
but had to return to his car for more money. R. 128. As he was 
getting money from the car, the officers approached. R. 129. 
They told him, "hold it right there." R. 129. The officers 
began questioning him about this condition, and Montoya 
ultimately responded that he had "smoked a joint and drank the 
beer." R. 131. 
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Montoya testified further that after he was placed in the 
police vehicle, the two officers went through his car and then 
used a flashlight to search the trunk until "some more officers 
pulled up." R. 131. The officers found nothing in the trunk. 
R. 132. Officer McCarthy then arrived and searched the car and 
trunk. R. 133. He pulled out "carpets and stuff" and, after 
about five minutes, found something. R. 133. 
According to Montoya, prior to the search, the heroin was 
under a carpet and insulation, apparently under the tire. 
R. 134. It could not be seen just by looking in the trunk. 
R. 134. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State failed to sustain its burden of establishing 
that a valid inventory search occurred in this case. The State 
failed to establish that impoundment was necessary where, among 
other things, officers were able to ascertain the owner's 
identity and return the vehicle. The officers' testimony failed 
to establish the standardized procedures which West Valley 
officers are required to follow in conducting inventory searches. 
The testimony does not establish, among other things, whether 
searching in the trunk and under the spare tire is part of a 
standardized inventory search. Nor does the testimony establish 
that inventory searches are designed to compile an inventory of 
items in the vehicle. Instead, the testimony established that 
officers have almost unlimited discretion as to how to proceed. 
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Additionally, the evidence in this case establishes that the 
search was a pretext to search for evidence. In this case where 
the State did not establish the necessity of impounding the 
vehicle, the vehicle was returned to its owner prior to 
impoundment, the officers acknowledged they were searching the 
vehicle for drugs, no inventory list was made, and the evidence 
was found in a container under the spare tire and the State did 
not put on evidence establishing that searching under a spare 
tire was part of standardized inventory procedures, the State 
failed to establish that this search fit within the inventory 
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the items seized 
from the vehicle must be suppressed. 
The trial court's determination that Montoya's Miranda 
rights were not violated because he did not make incriminating 
statements after being placed in custody is incorrect and clearly 
erroneous. McCarthy questioned Montoya after he was placed in 
custody and Montoya responded in an incriminating manner. The 
State did not establish that Montoya was Mirandized prior to such 
questioning or that he waived his rights. Accordingly, the trial 




POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE OFFICERS CONDUCTED A 
VALID INVENTORY SEARCH. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
The general rule under the Fourth Amendment requires that 
officers obtain a warrant based on probable cause in ordei to 
search an area in whi ch an individual holds a "reasonable 
"expectation of privacy.' State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 985 
(Utah App. 1992) [C:i tatii oris <: )iii i tted] . 
Several narrow] y drawn exceptions to the warrant 
requirement exist. Id. Where officers conduct a warrantless 
search, the S t a t e h a s t: h e b i i r c:i e n o f e s t a b 1 i s h i n g 11 l a t t h e 
circumstances of a search "constitute an exception to the warrant 
requirement." ii-L./ (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
762 (196 9); State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Uta 1 I 1984) ) 
A routine inventory search of a lawfully impounded 
vehicle is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment 
requirement. See South Dakota v. Opperman, >12 8 U.S. 3 64, 9 M 
S. Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). In Opperman, the United 
States Supreme Court held that police officers who follow a 
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standardized procedure for inventorying the contents of a 
lawfully impounded vehicle do not violate the Fourth Amendment in 
circumstances where there is no suggestion that the inventory 
"was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive." 
Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3099. 
The Opperman Court recognized that inventory searches 
serve three purposes: (1) "the protection of the owner's 
property while it remains in police custody," (2) protection of 
"the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen 
property," and (3) "the protection of the police from potential 
danger." Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3097; see also State v. Johnson, 
745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987) (citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 
96 S. Ct. at 3097) . Based on these purposes and the lesser 
expectation of privacy in vehicles, the Opperman Court concluded 
that inventory searches which are conducted pursuant to standard 
police procedures and which are not a pretext to search the 
vehicle for investigatory purposes are reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment even though such searches are not based on 
probable cause. 
Subsequent United States Supreme Court cases emphasize 
the role of standardized procedures in determining the 
reasonableness of inventory searches. See, e.g., Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); 
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 
(1990). 
In Bertine, the Court held that officers may open locked 
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containers during I: I:if.' course of an inventory search without 
violating the Fourth Amendment as long as such officers are 
following standardized procedures and are not acting "in bad 
faith or for the purpose of investigation " Bertine, "< ^n c ct. 
at 741. Relying on its decision in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 
U.S. 640, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983) t .he Coi irt 
indicated that officers may exercise discretion in conducting an 
inventory search "so long as such discretion is exercised 
according to standard criteria and on the basis of something 
other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." Bertine, 
107 S. Ct. at 743. Indeed, the Bertine court reaffirmed the 
principles that "l 0.; I ingle familiar standard is essential I. u 
guide officers, who have only limited time and expertise to 
reflect on and balance the social and individual interests 
involved :i : i the speci f ic circumstances they conf ront. ' " Id , , 
((quoting Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648, 103 S. Ct. at 2610) 
(quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 
2863, 69 L.Ed.*'d 768 (1981)). Hence, while officers may exercise 
some discretion where such discretion is guided by specific, 
standardized procedures, such discretion may not be completely 
unlimited and still pass constitutional muster. See also Florida 
v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). 
In Wells, 495 U.S. at 1, 110 S. Ct. at 1632, the Court 
further clarifies that in order to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment, inventory searches must be conducted according to 
standard procedures and not afford unlimited discretion no 
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officers. The Wells Court held that absent a standardized policy 
regarding the opening of closed containers during an inventory 
search, evidence seized from inside a closed container during an 
inventory search must be suppressed. Id. at 1635. 
The Wells Court emphasized that the requirement that 
inventory searches be conducted pursuant to standardized 
procedures arises out of the principle that an inventory search 
cannot be used as a subterfuge to search for investigatory 
purposes. Id. 
Our view that standardized criteria, [citation 
omitted], or established routine, Illinois v. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 
2610, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983), must regulate the 
opening of containers found during inventory 
searches is based on the principle that an 
inventory search must not be a ruse for a general . 
rummaging in order to discover incriminating 
evidence. The policy or practice governing 
inventory searches should be designed to produce 
an inventory. The individual police officer must 
not be allowed so much latitude that inventory 
searches are turned into "a purposeful and 
general means of discovering evidence of a 
crime," Bertine, 479 U.S., at 376, 107 S. Ct., at 
743 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635 (emphasis added). 
Various Utah cases have also discussed the parameters of 
inventory searches. See, e.g., Strickling, 844 P.2d at 979; 
State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695 (Utah 1986); State v. Sterger, 808 
P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1985); State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987). These cases 
along with Qpperman, Bertine and Wells establish: (1) the State 
has the burden of establishing "the necessity for the taking and 
the inventory of the vehicle" (Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268); (2) the 
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vehicle must be lawfully impounded for til le :i nv ei it or * r to be 
reasonable (Hygh, 711 P. 2d at 268; Ricef 7: ;;". ;.d at 696; 
Sterger, 808 P.2d at 125 ("the impoundment and inventory search 
of defendant's car" must be justified)). :-*=> inventory search 
must be conducted according to standardized procedures which are 
designed to produce an inventory of the items :i n the vehi c] e and 
not as a "fishing expedition for evidence" (Sterger, 808 P.2d at 
125); (;) the State has the burden of introducing evidence that 
such a standardized, reasonable procedure exists, "and that the 
challenged police activity was essentially in conformance with 
that procedure" (Strickling, 844 P.2d at 988 (quoting Hygh, 711 
P.2d at 269 (quo^  ;\. ~:.-J**>*-- Search and Seizure, Sec 4, mt 
576-77 (1978))); (5) while officers can exercise limited 
discretion when following standardized procedures, the allowance 
of unlii mi t e d d i s c r e t i o n :i n determining whetl le i to :i ropoi irid a 
vehicle or how to conduct an inventory violates the Fourth 
Amendment (Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635); (6) an inventory search 
cannot be condi icted as a pretext for investigating and searching 
for evidence of a crime (Hygh, 711 P.2d at 270; Rice, 717 P.2d at 
696) ; and (7) inventory of closed containers must be conducted 
according to standardized procedure explicitly regulating closed 
containers (Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 742; Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 
1635; Johnson, 745 P.2d at 455). 
In Hygh, the Utah Supreme Court held that the search 
could "not be fairly characterized as an inventory search" and 
therefore violated the Fourth Amendment ; 1 :i P. 2d at: 2 70 I'Tie 
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Court pointed out that although Salt Lake City has "a regularized 
set of procedures which guard against arbitrariness by an officer 
in the field," the officer did not follow the procedures. Id. at 
269-70. The officer "did not completely search the vehicle and 
did not make any kind of a list of the items in the automobile." 
Id.at 270. Additionally, it appeared that the officer was 
searching the vehicle for investigatory purposes since the 
officer, who noticed that Hygh resembled a picture of a robbery 
suspect, sent for and received that picture prior to conducting 
the search. Accordingly, the "'inventory' search was merely a 
pretext for a warrantless search," and the Utah Supreme Court 
suppressed the evidence. Id. 
In Steraer, 808 P.2d at 125, this Court indicated that an 
inventory search must be "conducted for inventory purposes, in a 
legal manner, and not merely as a 'fishing expedition for 
evidence'." The Steraer court held that a bifurcated inventory 
which was initiated immediately and completed later due to the 
need for the officer to prioritize his duties was a valid 
inventory search even though the written policies which were 
introduced into evidence were "silent as to how soon after a 
vehicle is impounded the inventory must be completed, and whether 
bifurcated searches are permitted." Id. 
While inventory searches must be made pursuant to 
standardized procedures which ensure that the inventory search is 
not a pretext for a warrantless investigatory search, a valid 
inventory search made by an officer with an investigatory motive 
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is valid under the Fourth Amendment. See Johnson ; '4 5 I • 2d at : 
454. Hence, a proper inventory search made pursuant to 
standardized procedures by an officer who is also searching for 
e v i d e n c e of the ::M ii i: le w i l l be upl l e l d , - . . 
11
 [T] he pivotal determination with respect to the 
inventory search issue" is whether the State 
presented sufficient evidence to support a 
finding that the searching officer "acted in 
compliance with established procedures for 
conducting an inventory search." "Inventories 
should not be upheld under Opperman unless the 
government shows that there exists an established 
reasonable procedure for safeguarding impounded 
vehicles and their contents and that the 
challenged police activity was essentially in 
conformance with that procedure." Hygh, 711 P.2d 
at 269 (quoting 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
7.4, at 576-77 (1978)) 
Strickling, 844 P.2d at 988. 
In the present case, the State failed to ea.i ry i ts bi n den 
of establishing the nature of the West Valley Police procedures 
for impounding vehicles or that the officers acted in compliance 
with such pi ocedures. The search in Ihiu <"M:II' Wdi.'i d subterfuge 
to search the vehicle and was not done pursuant to a valid 
inventory search. Accordingly, the trial judge erred in refusing 
to suppress the evidence seized from the car. 
A. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THE NECESSITY FOR 
TAKING AN INVENTORY OF THE VEHICLE. 
The State has the burden of establishing "the necessity 
f o r t:l le t a k i n g ai id t l le i n v e n t o r y of the v e h i c l e . " Hycrh, ; ] II P . 2d 
at 268. "If impoundment was neither authorized nor necessary, 
the search was unreasonable." Id. While the arrest of the 
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driver can be a proper justification for impounding a vehicle, 
arrest alone does not establish the necessity of impounding a 
vehicle. See Id. at 268-70. Instead, the State must sustain its 
burden by establishing the procedures which guide officers in 
determining whether to impound a vehicle and that the 
circumstances made impoundment lawful and necessary. Id. 
In this case, the State failed to establish that 
impoundment and taking of an inventory were necessary. Officers 
Gill and Schmidt searched the passenger compartment without first 
ascertaining the name of the owner of the vehicle. R. 109, 112, 
113, 115. The owner's name was apparently available and somewhat 
readily ascertainable since the officers were able to easily 
locate the owner that evening. R. 115-16, 125. The officers 
apparently learned the owner's identity through an "ID card as 
well as the bill of sale for the owners" (R. 110) which evidently 
were found in the vehicle. R. 110. Presumably, information 
regarding the owner's identity would be available in the glove 
box or through a routine computer check. Either way, the name 
could have been located prior to the officers' rummaging through 
the interior and trunk of the vehicle. 
Nor did the State establish precisely when the officers 
learned the name of the owner. The trial court found that the 
decision not to impound was made after the heroin was found. 
R. 52. This finding does not directly address when or how the 
officers learned the owner's identity. 
Schmidt testified that "the vehicle was going to be 
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impounds'- •• o f f i cer McCarthy a r r i v e d an I saii d 1 le ] :i lows t h i s 
person and possibly where this owner of the vehicle lived." 
R. 126. This suggests that the owner's name was known when 
McCarthy arrivec .. the scene. 
McCarthy testified that he was asked to impound the 
vehicle, but "'once we found out who the owners were, that' s whe xi 
I asked if I could take care of it in a different manner." 
R. 113. McCarthy indicated that the officers were still trying 
to find the owi i€ i : '" s i laine w h e n M c C a r t h y f ounrl h e r o i n i n t h e r runk . 
R. 109. Schmidt was with McCarthy, however, when they searched 
the trunk. ,1. 99-100, 109, 122. Because Schmidt was involved in 
tryinc ' • ascertain the ownei " s ident. ity, l.lii.w buggests thai I lie 
officers learned the name of the owner before the trunk was 
searched, or that they did not make an effort to ascertain the 
name until after the search was completed. Under either 
scenario, this evidence demonstrates that the State did not 
establish that impoundment was necessary. 
The State had the burden of establishing that a lawful 
impoundment occurred. In this case, where the owner's name 
apparently could have been ascertained before the search an I 1:1le 
vehicle was not impounded, the State failed to carry its burden 
of establishing that the search in this case occurred as part of 
a lawful impound. 
The State's failure to establish when or how the officers 
ascertained the identity of the owner combined with the remaining 
circumstances further demonstrates that the State did not. 
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establish that impoundment of the vehicle and taking an inventory 
were necessary in this case. The officers returned the vehicle 
to the owner shortly after the arrest. R. 52, 100, 115-16, 125. 
They did not produce an inventory in the police report or 
elsewhere.2 R. 52. They acknowledged that the search was 
conducted to find narcotics. Under such circumstances, the State 
failed to establish that impounding the vehicle was necessary. 
Instead, the Findings and Conclusions indicate that the officers 
began "impoundment procedures" inasmuch as they began searching 
the vehicle. R. 53. The Conclusions state further: 
Examination of the car preparatory to impoundment 
was according to procedures. The fact that an 
inventory sheet was not used was not fatal. The 
process was interrupted by the supervising 
officer's decision to return the car to its 
rightful owner. The search was not 
inappropriate, it was part of legitimate steps 
taken in the process of impoundment, which 
process was interrupted by the decision of 
Officer McCarthy. 
R. 53. 
The Findings and Conclusions fail to address the critical 
legal question of whether impoundment was necessary and whether a 
lawful impoundment under Opperman occurred in this circumstance 
where the officers did not list the contents or otherwise produce 
an inventory and returned the vehicle to its owner. 
2
 The trial court found that McCarthy "testified that an 
inventory list was not prepared in this case, but that money, 
needle, spoon and heroin removed from the car were noted in the 
police report." R. 52. The items listed in the police report were 
evidence--a spoon and syringe--and not an inventory of all items in 
the car. R. 112. Indeed, the police report did not include non-
evidentiary items which would normally be included in an inventory 
list. R. 104, 110. 
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11 i t h i s c: a s e \A, 1 1 e i: e t he S t: a t e £ a. i ] e ci t: o e s t ab 1 i s h t ha t 
impoundment was necessary, the search of the vehicle failed to 
qualify under the Fourth Amendment inventory exception. 
B. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE 
OF A STANDARDIZED, REASONABLE PROCEDURE FOR 
SAFEGUARDING IMPOUNDED VEHICLES AND THEIR 
CONTENTS AND IT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE 
POLICE CONDUCT WAS IN CONFORMANCE WITH SUCH A 
PROCEDURE. 
Police officers must follow a standardized procedure for 
inventorying the contents of a vehicle in order to comply with 
the Foi irth Amendment Opperman, 96 * . -
officers may exercise some discretion in carrying out such 
procedures, such discretion must not be unlimited. See Wells, 
110 S. 
The rationale for requiring standardized procedures and 
limiting police discretion is that such procedures and limits 
will preclude :i riventory searches from turning into "a ruse for a 
general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." 
Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635. The State has the burden of 
establishing the necessity of taking the inventory, the existence 
of standardized procedures which are designed to produce an 
inventory of the items, and that officers followed such 
procedures. Strickling, 844 P.2d at 988-89. 
The State can sustain its burden of establishing the 
existence and nature of the policy through the testimony of the 
officers. See Id. at 990. While the State need not introduce 
the written policy in order to establish the procedures, it must 
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nevertheless introduce testimony regarding the details of the 
inventory procedure in order to establish that the officers acted 
in compliance with an existing policy when searching the car. 
Id. 
In Stricklinq, the State relied on the officer's 
testimony regarding the established procedure for conducting an 
inventory search. According to that testimony, the vehicle must 
be searched completely and "the search will include but not be 
limited to the trunk, locked portions of the vehicles, locked 
cases etc." Id. The officer testified that he followed the 
procedure and did not deviate or terminate the search when he 
found the stereo. Based on that testimony, the district court 
found that the State established the existence of standardized 
procedures and that the officer followed those procedures in 
conducting the inventory search. This Court, while recognizing 
that the evidence of standardized procedures was "admittedly 
thin" in Stricklincr, nevertheless upheld the findings since they 
were not clearly erroneous in light of the officer's testimony. 
Id. 
In this case, the State failed not only to establish the 
necessity of taking the vehicle, it also failed to establish the 
existence of standardized procedures designed to produce an 
inventory or that the officers followed such procedures in this 
case. 
The State did not introduce a copy of the written policy. 
Instead, it relied on the testimony of the officers. R. 98, 
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1 0 3 - 0 6 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 1 6 1 8 . That t e s t i r no i i> fa i ] ed t o estab 1 ish the 
procedures of the West Valley Police for inventorying vehicles. 
Indeed, the testimony suggests that officers have complete, 
unguided discretion in decidi ilg whethei ;-_•: .; vehicle and 
in deciding whether to list the items found in a vehicle. Id.3 
The testimony also fails to establish whether the entire vehicle, 
including trunk, i s to be searched, and, if so, whether searching 
under the spare tire in the trunk is part of an inventory search. 
Nor does the testimony establish the procedi ire t: D be util i zed 
when officers encounter a container. 
The testimony regarding the procedure was "thinner" than 
the "admittedly thin" testimony in Stricklii.J .• railed l •-
establish the existence of a policy for inventorying vehicles 
which would produce an inventory rather than allow officers to 
embark oi i a fishi rig expediti on. See Stricklinc; 4 I • 2d at 990 
Officer Gill testified that his procedure when he 
impounds a vehicle is to " [iInventory a vehicle, take an 
inventory of all iteniy in the vehicle." K, ^H ».M .1 1 also 
testified that policies and procedures require officers to fill 
out a form as part of an inventory. R. 104. He later testified 
that policy <.;- ; . .re that a form be filled out for all 
inventory searches. R. 105-06. 
Defense counsel: And when you do an inventory 
search, do you fill out a form? 
Gill: Not always. 
3
 The trial court found in this case that " [t]he officers had 
considerable discretion in how to proceed" R, 52. 
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Defense counsel: Isn't it standard procedure? 
Gill: Depends on the type of search, depends on 
the totality of the circumstances, whether or not 
the vehicle's taken, state tax impounds, it's on 
impound reports. We didn't have an impound 
report at this time. 
R. 106. Gill's testimony fails to establish the policy for 
listing contents of a vehicle or any other policy or procedure 
for impounding or inventorying vehicles.4 
4
 In his oral ruling, the trial judge's only determination 
which touched on the standardized inventory procedures was a 
statement that "[t]he fact that the inventory sheet or inventory 
form was not used . . . does not make the search fatal because the 
ultimate impound of the vehicle was interrupted by Officer 
McCarthy's decision to attempt to return the vehicle to the 
rightful owner." R. 145. The State created an additional finding 
which appeared in the counsel-drafted Findings and Conclusions. 
The Findings and Conclusions state: 
[McCarthy] further testified that the West Valley 
impound procedure, which he assisted in 
formulating, provides that a special inventory 
list was not necessary in all circumstances. In 
some circumstances the contents of the car could 
be noted in the police report. The officers had 
considerable discretion in how to proceed. He 
further testified that an inventory list was not 
prepared in this case, but that the money, needle, 
spoon and heroin removed from the car were noted 
in the police report. No other contents of the 
car were noted in the police report. 
R. 52. The finding that McCarthy testified that the West Valley 
Police Department policy allowed officers to note the contents in 
the police report is clearly erroneous and not supported by the 
evidence. The marshalled evidence in support of this findings is 
as follows: 
(1) McCarthy testified that he notes items in the 
police report. R. 110-11. 
(2) McCarthy testified that there is "a section on the back 
of the handwritten report where you can fill in 
vehicle information." R. 116-17. (emphasis added) 
(3) McCarthy testified, "[w]e've been advised to just make 
a notation in your report, what if anything had to 
be unlocked or opened." R. 116-17. 
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McCarthy testified that he was familiar with f IIM- West 
Valley Police Department's policy regarding inventory searches 
and that he helped write it. R. 110 When asked to outline that 
po 1 icy, t: 1 ie fo1 1 ow:i ng exchange occurred: 
Prosecutor: And what is that policy with respect 
to making inventory searches of vehicles? In 
what circumstances is that done? 
McCarthy: Any time we arrest anybody, any time a 
vehicle's going to be impounded, an inventory 
will be done, and if possible, a canine officer 
will have the dog do a sniff of the vehicle for 
purposes of looking for narcotics. 
Prosecutor: And was that policy followed in this 
instance? 
McCarthy: No, if there's something out of place, 
you would note it. If there was something of 
value or something like that, you could take it 
into custody or you could give it to the owner. 
We do have an inventory sheet. I very frequently 
use it. I just note it in the narrative of the 
report. 
R. 110-11. 
O n c r oss - e x a m :i n a t i o n, M c C a r 11 i y t e s t :i f i e d t: 1 I a t h e rarely 
While McCarthy testified that he notes items in the police report, 
he did not testify that the procedures allowed him to list the 
inventory in the police report. R. 110-11. 
McCarthy's testimony regarding including vehicle 
information on the police reports says nothing about including an 
inventory list in the police report. 
Finally, McCarthy's testimony regarding notations for 
unlocked or opened containers addresses only such containers and 
not whether policy allows officers to include inventory lists in 
their reports. Nor do the findings or testimony establish that 
officers are required to make an inventory list--regardless of 
whether that list is on an inventory form, in the police report or 
on a separate sheet of paper. Instead, as the findings reflect, 
11
 [t]he officers had considerable discretion in how to proceed." 
R. 52. 
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used inventory forms. R. 116. 
Defense counsel: We don't have any inventory 
sheets or inventory forms, correct? 
McCarthy: No, I rarely use them. It's like they 
say, if it's a state tax, that is an inventory 
portion right on the state tax form. This 
vehicle wasn't being seized for that. I'd 
already determined to let the owners have it 
back. 
Defense counsel: Does West Valley City Police 
have such an inventory sheet? 
McCarthy: They do and it's the present policy, 
and the policy then is the supervisor on duty 
determines whether or not a car's going to be 
forfeitable and that night I knew, because there 
was a large lien on it, it was a brand new car, 
the city would not be interested in paying off 
the lien. 
Defense counsel: And isn't it true that the 
normal policy and procedure is to fill out the 
inventory sheet? 
McCarthy: No. Like I said, it's -- if it's 
going to be state tax, that is a state tax form. 
If it's just a driver arrest, hold for warrant, 
there's a section on the back of the handwritten 
report where you can fill in vehicle information. 
As far as inventory, there's been a lot of 
discussion on the bottom because there's no 
section there for locked containers. We've been 
advised to just make a notation in your report, 
what if anything had to be unlocked or opened. 
R. 116-17. 
McCarthy's confusing and contradictory testimony fails to 
establish the procedures to be followed for impounding and 
inventorying vehicles, or that such procedures were followed in 
this case. McCarthy indicated at one point that the policy is to 
do an inventory and call for a canine officer so that a dog can 
sniff the vehicle. R. 110-11. McCarthy testified, however, that 
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this policy was not followed in this case. R. 110-11. His later 
quoted testimony fails to specify the policy regarding 
impoundment decisions, making an inventory list, or any other 
details of an inventory such as (1) whether the search is to be 
completed if contraband is found, (2) whether locked containers 
are to be searched, and (3) whether searching below the spare 
tire in a trunk is part of a valid inventory search. 
The testimony of Officers Gill and McCarthy was the only 
evidence presented by the State regarding the West Valley Police 
Department inventory procedures and policies. This testimony 
fails to establish standardized procedures which officers are 
required to follow. Unlike Stricklinq, the testimony did not 
establish whether trunks and unlocked containers are to be opened 
or whether officers are required to search completely and produce 
an inventory even after contraband was found. Nor did the 
testimony establish whether officers were required to keep a list 
of items found. 
Much of the testimony involved what the officers did when 
they inventoried a vehicle rather than what policy required them 
to do. In fact, McCarthy testified inconsistently that he 
frequently used impound forms (R. 110) and that he rarely used 
them (R. 116-17) . What officers usually do or do not do does not 
establish what the policy requires. 
The testimony suggests unlimited discretion is afforded 
officers in deciding whether to list items and how to conduct an 
inventory. R. 106, 110-11, 116-17. Vehicles which are impounded 
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for state tax delinquencies apparently are subject to a more 
standardized procedure than vehicles impounded for driver 
arrests. R. 106, 116-17. Indeed, the trial judge found that the 
officers "had considerable discretion in how to proceed." R. 52. 
This unlimited discretion afforded officers does not meet the 
Fourth Amendment requirement that inventory searches be conducted 
pursuant to standardized procedures in order to be lawful. See 
Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 2610; Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1632-35. 
Although the officers' testimonies could be interpreted 
to allow an inventory without the use of an inventory sheet, that 
testimony fails to establish what the procedures are or that such 
procedures are designed to produce an inventory of items rather 
than to allow officers to conduct a fishing expedition. Gill's 
testimony suggests that the officer decides, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, whether to list the items. 
R. 105-06. McCarthy's testimony also suggests that the officer 
has complete discretion in deciding whether to list items found. 
Prosecutor: Now do you ordinarily make an 
inventory list in the course of this inventory 
search? 
McCarthy: No, if there's something out of place, 
you would note it. If there was something of 
value or something like that, you could take it 
into custody or you could give it to the owner. 
We do have an inventory sheet. I very frequently 
use it. I just note it in the narrative of the 
report. 
The officers found the heroin in the trunk, in a 
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container under the spare tire.5 R. 51-52, 109, 112-13. The 
State failed to establish that searching under spare tires is 
part of a routine, standardized inventory search in West Valley 
City. Nor did it establish that searching the trunk or opening 
containers was part of standardized procedures.6 
In this case, the State failed to present evidence which 
established that the West Valley Police Department inventory 
policies were designed to produce an inventory of items in the 
vehicle or that the officers followed such a procedure in this 
case. The search of this vehicle did not therefore fit within 
the inventory exception, and all items seized from the vehicle 
should be suppressed. 
C. THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE WAS AN 
IMPERMISSIBLE SUBTERFUGE TO SEARCH FOR NARCOTICS 
EVIDENCE. 
The totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the 
inventory search was a pretext or subterfuge to search the 
vehicle for evidence. The arresting officer asked for permission 
to search the vehicle. R. 103. The officer testified that he 
5
 The trial judge found that the heroin was under the spare. 
R. 51-2. This finding is contained in the State-drafted Findings 
and Conclusions. R. 50-54. This finding is supported by the 
evidence. R. 112-13. 
6
 In Johnson, 745 P. 2d at 455, the inventory search was 
upheld because the State established that the search was conducted 
pursuant to a mandatory Los Angeles Police Department checklist, 
and that areas under the hood and in the trunk are to be searched 
pursuant to that checklist. By contrast, in this case, the State 
did not present evidence as to whether searching the trunk or under 
spare tires was part of the standardized procedures for inventory 
searches. 
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could not remember Montoya's response to that request. R. 103. 
The arresting officer then decided to arrest Montoya and impound 
the vehicle. R. 98. The police report indicates the officers 
were searching for narcotics when they went through the car. 
R. 105. Additionally, McCarthy believes that one reason for an 
inventory search "is to find dope." R. 118. The officers did 
not prepare an inventory list, the officers apparently did not 
complete the inventory after they found the heroin, and the 
vehicle was not impounded. The heroin itself was found in a 
container under the spare tire, an area which would not be likely 
to be searched as part of a routine inventory search. R. 51-2, 
109. 
When the United States Supreme Court carved out the 
inventory search as an exception to the Fourth Amendment probable 
cause requirement, it clarified that such inventory searches did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment in circumstances where there is 
no suggestion that the inventory "was a pretext concealing an 
investigatory police motive." Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3099. 
Subsequent case law requires standardized procedures so that 
inventory searches cannot be used as "a ruse for a general 
rummaging in order to find incriminating evidence." Wells, 107 
S. Ct. at 1635. See also Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268 ("the inventory 
exception does not apply when the inventory is merely 'a pretext 
concealing an investigatory police motive'"); Rice, 717 P.2d at « 
696. 
Although the Utah and United States Supreme Courts have 
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rejected the pretext doctrine in arrest and seizure contexts (see 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1134 (Utah 1994); State v. Harmon, 
910 P.2d 1196, 1204 (Utah 1995); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
, 116 S. Ct. , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996))7, the inquiry as to 
whether an inventory search which is merely "a ruse for a general 
rummaging" should nevertheless be made in the inventory search 
contexts. 
The rationale for rejecting the "pretext doctrine" in 
Lopez was that an officer who detains an individual based on a 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause has complied with the 
Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness regardless of the 
subjective motivation of the officer. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135-
37; see also Whren, 135 L.Ed.2d at 101. The pretext doctrine is 
therefore unnecessary since the officer has a valid basis to 
detain the individual and is required under the Fourth Amendment 
to limit the scope of the detention to that which "is necessary 
to effectuate the purposes of the stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135 
(quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 
1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). 
7
 In Harmon and Lopez, the Court indicated that "[t]he 
pretext doctrine focuses on whether a hypothetical reasonable 
officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances, would have 
undertaken the challenged Fourth Amendment activity." Harmon, 910 
P.2d at 1204 (citing Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134) . The term "pretext" 
has not been used in precisely this manner in inventory search 
contexts. Rather than focusing on what the hypothetical reasonable 
officer would do, inventory cases focus on whether the inventory 
search was merely a pretext to search for evidence. The term 
"pretext" as used in the inventory search context is therefore 
different from the "pretext doctrine" as it evolved in reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause cases. 
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By contrast, an officer who conducts an inventory search 
does not proceed based on probable cause or particularized 
suspicion to search a vehicle. Instead, the Court created an 
inventory exception to the warrant requirement. "Because 
inventories promote such important interests and are not 
investigatory in purpose, they do not implicate 'the interests 
which are protected when searches are conditioned on warrants.'" 
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267.8 
In carving out a limited exception which is not based on 
probable cause or particularized suspicion, the courts have 
cautioned that the inventory search label cannot be used as a 
means for evading " [f]undamental constitutional guarantees 
against unreasonable searches." Id. 
In Whren, the United States Supreme Court recognized the 
distinction between employing pretext inquiries in the inventory 
search context as opposed to situations where the search or 
detention is based on probable cause. See Whren, 135 L.Ed.2d at 
96-97. The Court quoted its pretext language in Wells and 
Bertine, then distinguished those cases by pointing out that the 
officers did not have probable cause to support those searches. 
Id. The Whren court stated in part: 
But only an undiscerning reader would regard 
these cases [Wells, Bertine and New York v. 
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27, 96 L.Ed.2d 
601, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987) (an administrative 
8
 The interests protected by inventory searches are 
(1) protection of the owner's property, (2) protection of the 
police and public from potential danger, and (3) protection of 
police from claims of lost or stolen property. Id. 
36 
inspection case)] as endorsing the principle that 
ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct 
that is justifiable on the basis of probable 
cause to believe a violation of law has occurred. 
In each case we were addressing the validity of a 
search conducted in the absence of probable 
cause. Our quoted statement simply explains that 
the exemption from the need for probable cause 
(and warrant), which is accorded to searches made 
for the purpose of inventory or administrative 
regulation, is not accorded to searches that are 
not made for those purposes. See Bertine, supra, 
at 371-372, 93 L.Ed.2d 739, 107 S. Ct. 738; 
Burger, supra, at 702-703, 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 107 S. 
Ct. 2636. 
Whren, 135 L.Ed.2d at 97. (emphasis added) 
Cases have consistently held that a valid inventory 
search does not occur where "the inventory xis merely a pretext 
concealing an investigatory police motive.'" Hygh, 711 P.2d at 
268 (quoting Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3100); see also State v. 
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1987); Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 
1635. Indeed, the inventory exception is based on the 
determination that such searches are reasonable because they 
protect important interests, are conducted pursuant to 
standardized procedures, and are not used as a subterfuge to 
search for evidence. Therefore, an important justification for 
allowing an inventory search exception is that inventories are 
not conducted as a pretext or subterfuge. Inquiry into whether 
the inventory was conducted as a pretext or subterfuge for 
searching for evidence remains valid despite the decisions in 
Harmon and Lopez. 
In this case, the circumstances demonstrate that the 
"inventory" search was a pretext to search for narcotics. 
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Accordingly, a valid inventory search did not occur in this case. 
D. UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE 
SEARCH WAS NOT A VALID INVENTORY SEARCH; 
ACCORDINGLY, ALL ITEMS SEIZED FROM THE VEHICLE 
MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
The State failed to sustain its burden of establishing 
that under the totality of the circumstances, the search of the 
vehicle fit within the inventory search exception. 
The State failed to establish the procedures the West 
Valley Police Department follows in conducting inventory 
searches. The State also failed to establish whether searching 
the trunk of a vehicle or searching under the spare tire in the 
trunk was part of a routine inventory search in West Valley City. 
Nor did the State bear its burden of establishing that the 
officers followed standardized procedures in conducting this 
inventory search. See Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3099; Bertine, 107 
S. Ct. at 743; Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635; Stercrer, 844 P.2d at 
988; Hycrh 711 P.2d at 269; see discussion supra at 26-33. 
Additionally, the State failed to establish the necessity of 
impoundment. Indeed, the vehicle was returned to its owner 
without being impounded. See discussion supra at 21-25. 
The officers' failure to produce any sort of inventory 
along with the officers' admissions that they were searching for 
drugs further indicate that a valid inventory search did not 
occur in this case. Under the circumstances of this case, the 
officers' search of the vehicle and trunk was a pretext to search 
for drugs; the State failed to sustain its burden of establishing 
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that the search of this vehicle fit within the inventory 
exception. Because the State failed to establish that the 
evidence found in the vehicle was located during a valid 
inventory search, the evidence must be suppressed. See Wells, 
110 S. Ct. at 1635; Rice, 717 P.2d at 697. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE INCORRECTLY DENIED 
MONTOYA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS TAKEN IN 
VIOLATION OF MIRANDA 
All of the officers appear to agree that Montoya was in 
custody before McCarthy arrived. R. 97, 107, 121, 126. Officer 
Gill had placed handcuffs on Montoya. R. 107, 121. Montoya was 
under arrest at the time he was handcuffed. R. 121, 126. 
The State did not establish that any of the officers 
informed Montoya of his Miranda9 rights after he was arrested 
but before he made incriminating statements to McCarthy. R. 105, 
114, 124. After he arrived at the scene, McCarthy questioned 
Montoya. R. 108. 
McCarthy: [S]o I asked him -- street term. I 
asked him if he was doing some cheve. He stated 
he was, which is a street term of heroin. 
R. 108. 
Defense counsel: Isn't it true that even after 
the drugs were found, you continued to 
interrogate the defendant while he was seated in 
the police car? 
McCarthy: Like I said, my concern, it wasn't an 
interrogation type of thing because I know him 
and know the family. I wanted to make sure he 
9
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 
694 (1966) . 
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was okay. He finally told me he was going to 
overdose and that's why we were concerned about 
the medical people. 
R. 118. 
In his motion to suppress, Montoya requested that 
statements taken from him in violation of Miranda be suppressed. 
The trial judge resolved the Miranda issue by determining 
that M[t]here were no incriminating statements made after the 
arrests." R. 53. 
A. INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS WERE MADE AFTER 
THE ARREST. 
In his oral ruling, the trial judge stated: 
Trial Judge: Now, I am not persuaded that the 
fact or failure to Mirandize the defendant is a 
detriment to this defendant because I don't 
really see where the evidence has established 
anything that was of an incriminating nature 
after the time of the arrest prior to any 
Mirandizing being accomplished that would work to 
his detriment. Indeed, statements made, if they 
were, were in large part incomprehensible to the 
officers. 
R. 144. 
The trial judge's determination that "[t]here were no 
incriminating statements made after the arrest[]" appears in the 
written Findings and Conclusions as a "Conclusion of Law." 
R. 53. Regardless of whether this determination is considered a 
finding or conclusion, this Court should disregard the 
determination in resolving this issue because it is both 
incorrect and clearly erroneous. 
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The uncontroverted testimony in this case establishes 
that Montoya was under arrest when McCarthy arrived at the 
convenience store. R. 97, 107, 121, 126. Montoya was under 
arrest at the time he was handcuffed; he was handcuffed when 
McCarthy arrived. R. 107, 126. Officers Gill and Schmidt 
searched the interior of the vehicle after they had arrested 
Montoya; those officers had already searched the interior when 
McCarthy arrived. R. 98, 107, 112. The officers themselves 
agreed that Montoya was under arrest. R. 97, 107, 121, 126. 
McCarthy's testimony establishes that he questioned 
Montoya after McCarthy arrived at the scene and received 
comprehensible answers which were incriminating. R. 108, 118. 
McCarthy asked Montoya point blank if he were taking "cheve."10 
According to McCarthy, Montoya said he was. R. 108. In 
addition, McCarthy questioned Montoya about his condition. 
Montoya ultimately responded that he was going to overdose. 
R. 118. Based on this uncontroverted testimony, the trial 
judge's determination that no incriminating statements were made 
after arrest is incorrect and clearly erroneous.11 
10
 According to McCarthy, "cheve" is a street name for heroin. 
R. 108. 
11
 The marshalled evidence in suppport of this erroneous 
determination includes Gill's testimony that he had a conversation 
with Montoya after he was in custody but that the conversation 
"[d]idn't go very far" because Montoya "was having a hard time 
understanding any of [Gill's] questions." R.100. While this 
testimony supports a finding that Montoya did not make 
incriminating statements to Gill after he was in custody, it does 
not address the statements to McCarthy. Additionally, Gill 
testified that Montoya made a statement about beer and a joint to 
Gill shortly after the officer arrived. R. 96, 103. While this 
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B. THE STATE DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE 
ESTABLISHING THAT THE OFFICERS INFORMED MONTOYA 
OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS PRIOR TO THE INTERROGATION 
BY MCCARTHY. 
The trial judge's findings regarding the Miranda issue 
apparently include a finding that the officers did not Mirandize 
Montoya immediately after arrest. R. 118. When stating his 
ruling on the record, the judge began his Miranda ruling by 
stating: 
Trial Judge: Now, I am not persuaded that the 
fact or failure to Mirandize is a detriment . . . 
R. 118. (emphasis added) 
The judge continued: 
. . . because I don't really see where the 
evidence has established anything that was of an 
incriminating nature after the time of arrest 
prior to any Mirandizing being accomplished . . . 
R. 118. (emphasis added) In addition, the counsel-drafted 
Findings and Conclusions do not include a finding that Montoya 
was Mirandized and instead rely on the erroneous determination 
that Montoya did not make incriminating statements after he was 
arrested. R. 53. 
The testimony demonstrates that the State did not sustain 
its burden of establishing that the officers Mirandized Montoya 
and that Montoya waived his Miranda rights prior to the custodial 
interrogation by McCarthy. See Miranda, 86 S. Ct. at 1628 (heavy 
burden on State to demonstrate waiver). 
testimony supports a finding that no incriminating statements were 
made to Gill after arrest, the evidence establishes that McCarthy 
questioned an in custody Montoya and received incriminating 
responses. R. 97, 107, 121, 126, 108, 118. 
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Officers McCarthy and Schmidt testified that they did not 
inform Montoya of his Miranda rights. R. 114, 124. Officer Gill 
never testified that he informed Montoya of his Miranda rights 
prior to the custodial interrogation. R. 105. The following 
exchange is the only reference by Gill to Miranda rights. 
Defense counsel: Isn't it true that you never 
gave the defendant Miranda warnings? 
Officer Gill: No. 
R. 105. While this response suggests that at some point Gill 
gave Montoya Miranda warnings, it does not demonstrate that such 
warnings were given prior to the statements made in response to 
McCarthy's interrogation. If Gill gave Montoya Miranda warnings 
at the jail or on the way to the jail or even the following week, 
he would have responded as he did. At any rate, Gill's testimony 
failed to establish that Gill gave Montoya Miranda warnings prior 
to McCarthy's interrogation. 
For the State to sustain its burden, it would have had to 
ask Gill follow-up questions which would establish that Gill 
delivered Miranda warnings prior to McCarthy's custodial 
interrogation. The State's failure to ask such questions, 
particularly in the face of Montoya's claim and the burden placed 
on the State, suggests that Gill did not give Miranda warnings 
prior to the custodial interrogation. 
A defendant must knowingly and voluntarily waive his 
Miranda rights in order to admit a statement. Miranda, 86 S. Ct. 
at 1630. Courts employ "every reasonable presumption against 
such waiver." State v. Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah App. 
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1995). In addition, a Miranda warning is "an absolute 
prerequisite to interrogation." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 
354 (Utah App. 1913). Statements elicited through custodial 
interrogation in the absence of a Miranda warning are 
inadmissible. Id. 
In this case, the State has not established that an 
officer Mirandized Montoya prior to McCarthy's custodial 
interrogation or that Montoya waived such rights. 
C. MCCARTHY INTERROGATED MONTOYA. 
McCarthy's testimony establishes that McCarthy questioned 
Montoya. R. 108, 118. McCarthy attempted to explain his 
interrogation by indicating that he was concerned for Montoya's 
safety. Regardless of whether the questioning was motivated by a 
safety concern, it nevertheless amounted to interrogation. As 
such, Miranda and its progeny required that Montoya be informed 
of his rights prior to such interrogation. See Wood, 868 P.2d 70 
(Utah 1993); Snyder, 860 P.2d at 358. 
D. MONTOYA'S STATEMENTS TO MCCARTHY MUST BE 
SUPPRESSED. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees that a defendant shall 
not be "compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself." To secure this 
fundamental right, Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 U.S. 
436 (1966), established procedural safeguards to 
be followed in a custodial interrogation. The 
prescribed procedures require a warning that the 
defendant has the right to remain silent and the 
right to have an attorney present during 
questioning. Id. at 444. 
44 
Wood, 868 P.2d at 81. 
A Miranda warning is required prior to any custodial 
interrogation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. See Wood, 868 P.2d at 81-
82; Miranda, 86 S. Ct. at 1630. Where officers fail to give the 
required Miranda warnings prior to a custodial interrogation, an 
accused's subsequent statement must be suppressed. Wood, 868 
P.2d at 81; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1630. 
In this case, the State failed to establish that the 
officers gave Montoya the required Miranda warnings prior to this 
statements to McCarthy. R. 105, 114, 124. Indeed, in the face 
of Montoya's claim that he was not Mirandized, the State's 
failure to put on contrary evidence that the officer Mirandized 
Montoya implies that no such timely warnings were given. Under 
such circumstances, the trial judge's denial of Montoya's motion 
to suppress the statements must be reversed. Montoya 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse that portion of the 
order and remand the case to the trial court where he be given 
the opportunity to withdraw his conditional plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand this case to allow him the opportunity 
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to withdraw his conditional plea. 
^ SUBMITTED t h i s oCP'^dav of Sep tember , 1996, 
Cjkh\ CakW 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. 0. Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this ^^fo^dav of 
September, 1996. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED this day of September, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM A 
JOAN C. WATT, #3967 
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TK.v-. - . •. - " -fqt 
MAR 2 9 1S96 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
RANDY J. MONTOYA, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
ORDER AND RESENTENCING 
NUNC PRO TUNC 
Case No. 951900016 
HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Based upon petition and stipulation of counsel and for 
good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that based upon a finding that 
Petitioner RANDY J. MONTOYA was denied his constitutional right 
to appeal, Petitioner is hereby resentenced nunc pro tunc 
pursuant to State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), and 
State v. Hallett. 856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993). Petitioner is 
resentenced nunc pro tunc to the sentence imposed on April 7, 
1995. 
DATED this March, 1996. 
0 f»<li s ,\ 
JUSSE^T 
IN THE THIRD JUDTCTAtDISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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D The motion of. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason^why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a j ^ 
D plea of r\o contest; 
a class. 
i v
i D jury;^] t te court; J^plea of guilty; 
of the offense of -a felony 
" - - • - - - ' " "''' ' 1 anc* ' ' of the O degree, Q  l ss misdemeanor, being now present in court d ready for sentence and 
represented by , and the State being represented by ! f i £ \ is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
• to a maximum mandatory term of 
y ^ n o t to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; 
^ a n d ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $-
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_ 
years and which may be for life; o L \ ^ \ Q U v ^ S 
to _ 
oo 
ja. such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with _ ^ \ \ 
are hereby dismissed. \sse upon motion o f ^S ta te , D Defense, QCourt, Count(s) ^ ±- A 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation i r iW 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
V Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^(for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this. Judgment and Commitment. 
^ C o m m i t m e n t shall issue ^ v ^ \ ^ v ^ \ H 
Q?\SO^X 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
7*" day of 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
ADDENDUM B 
David W. Brown - 5671 
Attorney for Defendant 
2727 West 3500 South, Suite 220 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (801) 964-6200 
n F , L E D 
DISTRICT COURT 
c=; S3 F E B - I PM It= l»2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ! 
vs. ; 
RANDY MONTOYA, ] 
Defendant. ] 
i MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
I Case No. 951900016 FS 
I Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his counsel of 
record, and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, moves this Court for an Order 
suppressing all evidence, oral or tangible, obtained directly or 
indirectly from: 
The August 24, 1994 arrest, detention and interrogation 
of Defendant, and the search and seizure of evidence from his girl 
friend's 1994 Mitsubishi• Evidence seized from the vehicle 
included heroin and drug paraphernalia. 
The arrest, detention, interrogation, search and seizure 
were in violation of Defendant's constitutional rights under the 
Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution, and under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
At approximately 3:15 a.m.. on August 24, 1994, Defendant 
was illegally stopped by several West Valley City police officers 
0 0 0 0 2 0 
while he was on the premises of a 7-11 located at 4600 South 4000 
West. Defendant had been shopping at the 7-11. At the time police 
arrived, Defendant was outside the store and outside the vehicle. 
Defendant was arrested for public intoxication. The 
vehicle was not impounded. The vehicle was released to its 
rightful owner and regular driver, Shannon Pina, and her sister, 
Shantel Santos. 
Defendant seeks to suppress statements made to the police 
which were part of a custodial interrogation and elicited without 
any Miranda warning. In response to direct police questioning, 
Defendant told them he had been drinking and had used drugs. 
All evidence seized was the fruit of the original illegal 
un-Mirandized confession of Defendant by the officers. Because the 
stop and interrogation were unconstitutional, all evidence 
subsequently seized is inadmissible. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 
181, 184 (Utah 1987); see, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471 (1963). 
The evidence seized was found during an alleged inventory 
search, even though the vehicle was not impounded. The inventory 
search was merely a pretext to search for drugs. 
Defendant respectfully requests this Court order the 
suppression of all evidence resulting from the illegality alleged 
herein, and which is described with more particularity in the 
attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof. 
The suppression hearing has been scheduled for February 
6, 1995, at 10:00 a.m. 
2 
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DATED this 1st day of February, 1995, 
David W, Brdwii ^—-^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the 
foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS were 
hand-delivered this 1st day of February, 1995, to the following: 
Cy H. Castle 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, #S3700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
&^0 ^£jOfi 
000022 
David W. Brown - 5671 
Attorney for Defendant 
2727 West 3500 South, Suite 220 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (801) 964-6200 
^STRICT COURT 
95FEB -f P/H:t,2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT re©URTcT£RK 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





MEMORANDUM OF POINTS ANI 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 951900016 FS 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his counsel of 
record, and hereby files this Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Defendant respectfully requests the opportunity to 
supplement this Memorandum following the evidentiary hearing on 
February 6, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about August 24, 1994, Defendant was stopped 
at the 7-11 on 4600 South 4000 West in West Valley City. 
2. The West Valley City Police stopped him outside the 
7-11 at approximately 3:15 a.m. 
3. Defendant had driven to the 7-11 in his girlfriend's 
vehicle, a 1994 Mitsubishi. (Police report at 5.) 
4. Defendant had been shopping at the 7-11, and had 
returned to the vehicle to secure some change to complete paying 
for some food. 
0 0 0 0 2 3 
5. At the time the police arrived, Defendant was 
outside the store and also outside the vehicle. 
6. Defendant was immediately handcuffed and placed into 
custody for public intoxication. 
7. The police asked Defendant "if he had been drinking 
or taking any types of drugs." (Police report at 5.) 
8. Defendant "told [police] that he had been drinking 
earlier and that he had smoked a joint." (Police report at 5). 
9. The police then made an extensive search of the 
vehicle, which the officers described as an "inventory" search. No 
inventory form, report, list or sheet was completed. 
10. During the exhaustive search of said vehicle, the 
police found and seized a syringe, a cut-off tablespoon, 1.25 
ounces of heroin, and a telephone bill. The heroin was found in 
the trunk. The police also seized $835 from Defendant's wallet. 
11. The vehicle was not impounded; it was returned to 
Shantel Santos, the sister of Defendant's girlfriend, Shannon Pina. 
12. The police report states that the vehicle was not 
Defendant's, and was returned to its owner. (Police report at 6.) 
13. Police further interrogated Defendant, who allegedly 
admitted that he had recently used heroin, approximately five $20 
bags. (Id.) 
14. At no time did any officer give Defendant his 
Miranda warnings. 
15. Defendant was arrested and charged with a second 
degree felony for unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute, a Class B Misdemeanor for unlawful 
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possession of drug paraphernalia, and a Class C Misdemeanor for 
intoxication. (See Information). 
ARGUMENT 
I. All Statements Defendant Made To Police Should Be 
Suppressed For Violation of Miranda. 
This Court should suppress all statements made to the 
West Valley City officers because they were elicited as part of a 
an improper custodial interrogation on August 24, 1994. 
The officers specifically asked Defendant if he had been 
drinking or using illegal drugs. These questions resulted in the 
alleged confession by Defendant that he had been both drinking and 
using illegal drugs. Defendant allegedly told the officers that he 
had earlier "smoked a joint," and also used about five $20 bags of 
heroin. 
This interrogation by the officers is in clear violation 
of the doctrine established in Miranda v. Arizonar 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). Defendant was never given any Miranda warning during the 
questioning by West Valley City officers. It is undisputed that 
Defendant was subject to interrogation by various officers, and 
that he was handcuffed and in custody during this period. The 
questions asked by the officers were designed to elicit 
incriminating remarks from Defendant. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 
U.S. 291 (1984). A reasonable person in Defendants position would 
not have felt free to leave or tell the officers to leave and 
terminate the encounter. Berkemer v. McCartyr 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
In this case, Defendant's freedom of movement was restricted to 
such a degree that it was akin to an arrest. United States v. 
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Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987). 
Since the alleged confession regarding drugs was not 
given freely and voluntarily, it was coerced and in gross violation 
of Miranda. All statements made by Defendant should be suppressed. 
II. All Evidence Seized From The Vehicle Should Be 
Suppressed As Fruit Of The Original Illegal Confession. 
The statements elicited from Defendant by the officers 
were clearly improper and inadmissible. Such inadmissible 
statements cannot be used by police to justify a search of the 
vehicle. 
All evidence obtained as a result of the illegality, 
including the subsequent results of the vehicle search, should be 
suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United 
Statesf 251 U.S. 385 (1920). There are no facts which would argue 
that the later search and seizure were attenuated from the taint of 
the original illegal confession. Almost no time elapsed between 
the confession and the search. 
The officers used the information about drugs obtained 
from Defendant to search the vehicle. All evidence seized was then 
tainted by the initial unconstitutional confession. 
The United States Supreme Court has frowned on law 
enforcement entities using illegally obtained evidence to then 
secure further evidence through proper channels. In Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920), the 
government seized documents from defendants which the federal court 
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had suppressed because of an unlawful seizure. The government then 
issued subpoenas for the same documents, basing its request on 
information secured from the illegal search and seizure. The Court 
ruled that the subpoenas were invalid because they were based upon 
knowledge gained from illegally seized evidence. Id. at 391-92. 
"The Court stated that the knowledge gained by the 
government's own misconduct could not be used in this manner if the 
Fourth Amendment was to be more than 'mere words.'" W. Ringel, 
Searches & Seizures, Arrest and Confessionsr vol. 1, §3.2(b) at 3-6 
(1994). 
Under Silverthorne Lumber Companyr it is clear that any 
evidence or knowledge obtained through illegal means cannot be used 
to justify a vehicle search. The Court stated: 
The Government now, while in form repudiating and 
condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its 
right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that 
means which it otherwise would not have had. 
The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. 
It is that although of course its seizure was an outrage 
which the Government now regrets, it may study the papers 
before it returns them, copy them, and then may use the 
knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in 
a more regular form to produce; that the protection of 
the Constitution covers the physical possession but not 
any advantages that the Government can gain over the 
object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act ... 
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of 
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so 
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it 
shall not be used at all. 
Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 391-92 (emphasis added). 
Justice Holmes' decision in Silverthorne Lumber Company 
formed the basis for the landmark "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
decision in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). 
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This Court should apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine 
to suppress all evidence seized from the vehicle as fruits of the 
initial illegalities. The methods used by the officers to gather 
evidence are similar to the backdoor approach to securing evidence 
that the Supreme Court quashed in Sil vert home Lumber Company. 
In this case, the officers easily could have read 
Defendant his Miranda warnings prior to the interrogation. Their 
failure to advise him of his constitutional rights renders the 
confession inadmissible, as well as the fruits of said confession 
— the drugs and paraphernalia. 
III. The Inventory Search Is Rendered Invalid By The Officers' 
Failure To Impound the Vehicle. 
It is anticipated that the State will attempt to justify 
this search as a valid inventory search. Defendant has found no 
"inventory" search cases in which the vehicle was not impounded. 
The officers' failure to impound said vehicle renders the purported 
"inventory" search totally improper. Further, the facts of this 
case do not justify such a search. 
Defendant's constitutional rights as set forth in the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
and article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, which prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures, were violated. See, State v. 
Potter. 863 P.2d 40, 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The Fourth Amendment secures the right to be free from 
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohior 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). This protection from unreasonable searches and seizures 
extends to cars. State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1992) (citing Delaware v. Prouser 440 U.S. 648 (1971). 
"The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated ... 
because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of these Amendments, even 
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting 
detention quite brief." Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1043 (quoting Prouse, 
440 U.S. at 653. The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from 
randomly or arbitrarily stopping vehicles. Id. at 1043. 
In this instance, the facts show that the 1994 Mitsubishi 
belonged to Defendants girl friend, Shannon Pina. Instead of 
impounding the vehicle, it was returned to Ms. Pina and her sister, 
Shantel Santos. Prior to beginning the search, the police had 
elicited statements from Defendant that he had been using drugs. 
The search performed was for drugs, not to inventory said vehicle. 
It is well established that an inventory search is an 
exception to the warrant requirement. See, South Dakota v. 
Oppermanr 428 U.S. 364 (1976). The policy reasons for permitting 
a warrantless search of an "impounded vehicle" are to protect the 
public and police from danger, avoid police liability for lost or 
stolen property, and protect the owner's property. Id.; State v. 
Hygh. 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). 
None of these policy reasons apply when the vehicle is 
not impounded. Thus, the police cannot inventory a vehicle in 
preparation for impounding, then decide not to impound the vehicle, 
and still use the seized evidence as part of a valid inventory 
search. Such a scenario runs totally afoul of the case law and 
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doctrine permitting inventory searches as an exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
IV. The Alleged Inventory Search Was a Mere Pretext 
Concealing Police Motive To Search for Drugs. 
The case law interpreting inventory searches establishes 
that the West Valley City officers cannot use their "inventory" 
search as a mere pretext to justify such a search for drugs. 
However, the inventory exception does not apply when the 
inventory is merely a "pretext concealing an 
investigatory police motive." Fundamental constitutional 
guarantees against unreasonable searches cannot be evaded 
by labeling them "inventory" searches. 
State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d at 268. 
The decision in Hygh is directly in point. Gillis Hygh 
had been convicted of aggravated robbery based upon evidence seized 
from the trunk of his vehicle purportedly during an inventory 
search. Hygh had been stopped for an expired safety inspection 
sticker. During the stop, the officer determined that Hygh had 
outstanding warrants. The officer also suspected Hygh had 
committed other crimes. He then proceeded to search the vehicle 
under the "inventory" exception to the warrant reguirement. Id. at 
266-67. In the trunk, the officer found evidence linking defendant 
to a recent robbery. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the lower court 
conviction, holding that the inventory search was not proper since 
it was pretextual and not conducted according to proper procedures. 
Id. at 268-70. Hygh formed the basis for a similar reversal in 
State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1986). "The purpose of the 
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impound was to further the investigation of defendant's suspected 
drug activities by creating a pretext for a custodial search." 
Rice, 717 P.2d at 696. 
The "impound" search by West Valley City is similar to 
the searches which resulted in reversals in Rice and Hygh. The 
impound search was merely a pretext for the officers to look for 
narcotics. The search followed none of the normal inventory steps 
or procedures. Utah courts have frowned upon inventory searches 
which are not conducted in a legal manner and are merely a "fishing 
expedition for evidence." State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 987 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122, 125 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Based upon the overwhelming constitutional violations 
involved in the search and seizure involving Defendant, all 
evidence should be suppressed. 
CQNCLVSIQN 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant 
Defendant's Motion and suppress all statements made by Defendant 
and evidence seized from the 1994 Mitsubishi on August 24, 1994. 
DATED this 1st day of February, 1995. 
David W. Brown* -"^ ^ 
Counsel for Defendant 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 951900016 FS 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th 
day of February, 1995, on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the 
Defendant being present and represented by David W. Brown and the 
State of Utah represented by Richard S. Shepherd. Testimony was 
taken from Defendant and West Valley Police Officers Paul Gill, 
James Schmidt and William McCarthy. Following the taking of 
evidence, the matter was argued both on the facts and the law by 
both counsel for the Defendant and counsel for the State. The 
Court having heard the evidence and argument and being fully 
advised in the premises makes these Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On August 24, 1994, at 3:07 A.M., West Valley Police 
Officers Gill and Schmidt responded to a call at a Seven-Eleven 
Store located at 4600 South 4000 West. Upon arriving at the scene 
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they found the Defendant, Randy J. Montoya, in the parking lot of 
the store. The Defendant was wearing only boxer shorts and 
sandals. He was walking about in a nervous manner. His movements 
were "jerky." His behavior was erratic. He was talking to 
himself. 
After observing the Defendant the officer came to the 
conclusion that the Defendant was under the influence of some 
drugs, and potentially a danger to himself or others. He was 
placed under arrest and handcuffs were placed on him. When 
questioned by Officer Gill, Defendant said he had consumed alcohol 
and smoked a "joint." 
Officers Gill and Schmidt prepared to impound the car 
inasmuch as the driver was under arrest. They began an inventory 
search. They did not use an inventory or impound form. Inside the 
vehicle between the seats Officer Gill found a hypodermic needle 
and a spoon. Money was found scattered on the floor. The officers 
called for assistance from Officer McCarthy. 
Officer McCarthy, who was the supervising officer and 
also an expert in narcotics matters, came to the scene. He 
observed the Defendant. He saw that he was frothing at the mouth, 
his eyes were dilated and there appeared to be fresh needle marks 
on his arms. Officer McCarthy, based upon his prior experience, 
believed the Defendant had ingested drugs. He was afraid that the 
Defendant may have overdosed. Medical help was called, and 
eventually the Defendant was taken to the hospital. 
Officer McCarthy looked in the trunk area of the car. In 
the area under the spare tire he found five containers containing 
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a substance that he believed to be black tar heroin. 
Officer McCarthy testified that he determined that the 
car that the Defendant had driven was in fact owned by someone 
other than the Defendant, and that the owner was a person with whom 
he was acquainted. He testified that as the supervising officer he 
decided not to impound the car, but to notify the real owner. The 
decision not to impound was made after the drugs were found. He 
testified that the car was a new car with a large lien, that would 
not be a likely prospect for forfeiture, and further that he wished 
to save the owner cost and inconvenience. The car was returned to 
the owner. At the time McCarthy returned the car, he asked to 
search the apartment of the vehicle's owner, Shannon Pina. She 
refused to consent to the search. 
He further testified that the West Valley impound 
procedure, which he assisted in formulating, provides that a 
special inventory list was not necessary in all circumstances. In 
some circumstances the contents of the car could be noted in the 
police report. The officers had considerable discretion in how to 
proceed. He further testified that an inventory list was not 
prepared in this case, but that the money, needle, spoon and heroin 
removed from the car were noted in the police report. No other 
contents of the car were noted in the police report. 
The Defendant testified that he was not in fact 
intoxicated. He admitted that he had in fact used heroin earlier, 
and that he was taken to the hospital where he was treated for the 
effects of that drug. Defendant testified that the vehicle was 
searched two times, the items being seized on the second search. 
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The Court finds that the testimony of the officers was 
credible. There was a legitimate basis for the arrest. It was a 
lawful arrest. There were no incriminating statements made after 
the arrest. 
After the arrest it was reasonable to begin impoundment 
procedures, the car could not be left in the parking lot at 3:00 
A.M. Examination of the car preparatory to impoundment was 
according to procedures. The fact that an inventory sheet was not 
used was not fatal. The process was interrupted by the supervising 
officer's decision to return the car to its rightful owner. The 
search was not inappropriate, it was part of legitimate steps taken 
in the process of impoundment, which process was interrupted by the 
decision of Officer McCarthy. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this rt/p^ay of March, 1995. 
BY THE .COURT: 
Approved as to form and 
content: 
David W. Br* 
Attorney for Defendant 
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